Abstract The academic debate on the interpretation of literary texts has always suffered from the semantic ambiguity of key concepts (literature, meaning, interpretation, literary study, etc.). To get out of this dead end, literary scholars have to step back from their daily routine from time to time to consider what kind of activity they are actually engaged in, since nothing in academia is natural or self-evident; instead, all is contingent.That is, scholars are not talking about literary texts as givens or data; they are talking about problems they have with what they deem literary items. If literary scholars aim at a scientific solution for their respective problems, they have to meet the usual standards of science; that is, they have to solve explicitly spelled-out problems via explicit problem-solving strategies or methods. This holds equally true for all problems subsumed under the title ''interpretation.'' The point is not can interpretation be reasonable, possible, or neglectable; rather, can literary scholars perform the operation called interpretation in terms of theory-guided operationalized productions of experiential knowledge which can be stabilized in respective scholarly discourses via communicative connectability and intersubjective inspection.
. . . Instead of lamenting the incoherence of literary studies (as a discipline) or of praising it as a welcome legitimization, we should regard the heterogeneity of methods and positions as progress which confronts the discipline with new problems, but which also provides new possibilities. (Danneberg and Vollhardt , my translation) This state-of-the-art statement, found on the cover of a reader edited by two prominent German liteary scholars, Lutz Danneberg and Friedrich Vollhardt, Vom Umgang mit Literatur und Literaturgeschichte [Dealing with literature and literary history], brings to mind Helmut Heißenbüttel's dictum ''Dem ist nichts mehr hinzuzufügen!'' Once again, the discipline has survived a period of metatheoretical reflections; few scholars participated in this dangerous debate. And now the silent majority recalls this period of theoretical curiosity only when the daily job of interpreting literary texts has a break.
The statement is, as far as I can see, a thinly masked declaration of intellectual bankruptcy. It tells us that criteria regarding theories and methods are no longer serious topics in scholarly discourses; we learn that we have to regard claims for legitimizing the discipline as belonging to ''the discipline's history. In the meantime the academic routine has yielded new procedures and new criteria for evaluating efficiency and results. In front of this background it is only nasty to insist on a theoretical legitimization of those approaches which today dominate the discipline. . . . People have learned to accept not only pluralism, but even arbitrariness of methods.'' A ''hostile animosity against theories'' is simply stated, and the evidence of that praxis of interpretation is underpinned ''which is still oriented towards traditional hermeneutic ideas'' (ibid.: ).
What should one add to this intellectual clearing sales of literary studies proposed by Danneberg and Vollhardt, two of its leading figures in Germany, especially when we are informed in a smart, cool tone that a rational procedure of interpretation oriented toward the procedure of sciences ''is no longer aimed at''? I should stop here and say finis. But since Benjamin Harshav has been a companion of my intellectual life from its very beginning, I shall tell him my end of the interpretation story-and I promise this will be the last time.
What Are We Talking About?
Debating interpretation has always suffered from the semantic ambiguity of this concept, which is used rather differently by the scholars engaged in such activity. Consequently, nearly everybody questions nearly everybody's presuppositions and thus often feels misunderstood. A second pitfall follows as soon as scholars have agreed on a common formula, be it as vague as the formula ''that interpretation is in general regarded to be a kind of meaning attribution'' (Danneberg : ) . Now the question for presupposed theories becomes inescapable. What is the meaning of ''meaning,'' and in the framework of which theory of language or cognition? How are meanings attributed and which kind or procedure of attribution is accepted for which reasons? Do we, as literary scholars, really need an explicit methodology and method of meaning attribution, or can we simply rely on professional expertise and routine? Finally, the question arises-and I think it is a very reasonable question-who, other than teachers and literary scholars, is interested in the results of scholarly interpretations at all?
When we try to answer these questions, it becomes clear that the claim for a pluralism of methods, so favored in literary scholarship, is systematically misleading, because what is at stake is not a pluralism of methods but a pluralism of theories. For this reason we can only hope for a precise concept(ion) of ''interpretation'' if we argue in the framework of explicit theories of ''literature'' and ''literary studies,'' ''text'' and ''medium,'' ''meaning'' and ''understanding.'' Because we are still missing these theories, the problem of interpretation is supposed to remain in its present state. In other words, the academic caravan travels through the desert and everybody rides his or her unique camel in a unique style.
I predict that even if somebody invented such explicit theories to solve the above-mentioned problems, that person would not be accepted into the community of literary scholars, because one would be forced to abandon cherished positions, conceptions, and routines and recognize the intellectual superiority of somebody else. In addition, since no gauge for a rational comparison and critique of theories in literary studies has been accepted until today, I doubt there will be a change in the status quo of literary studies in the future. That is, interpretation will remain what each literary scholar declares it to be, either by definition and explication or by daily praxis. Experience tells me that every attempt to introduce a rational and explicit theory into literary scholarship as well as any demand to legitimate scholarly work in this domain is immediately refused by a majority of scholars as normative and imperialistic. Hostility toward theory and methodology is not a postmodernistic phenomenon; what might be diagnosed as new in recent antitheoretical positions is that this antiposition appears in terms of irony or condescension.
I should conclude this article here. But perhaps it would be more convincing to add (in a systems-theoretical attitude) that social systems, such as literary scholarship, are self-organizing and cannot be manipulated from outside, and for this reason theories and methods come and go-varietas de-lectat. Or I might emphasize, following Klaus Blaudzun and Heinz-Jürgen Staszak (: ), ''that interpretation does not exist as an abstract identity. Instead, it is fluid, it changes in the past and present, that is to say it is a diversity''-panta rhei.
So here comes another attempt at clarifying some basic problems in the debate on interpretation.
What Happens If We Have Problems?
In the past, many scholars have proposed the concept of scientific activities in terms of problem-solving activities. In this section I formulate the proposal in a constructivist way.
My first hypothesis is: Scientists do not talk about objects; instead they talk about phenomena and problems. Phenomena and problems, however, do not exist in themselves; they exist only in relation to scientists, which is to say, in relation to knowledge, interests, needs, and preferences in sociohistorical situations.
This hypothesis is based on the insight that we should start with differences and not identities because any kind of object-constitution-in perception or in communication-happens via distinction and denomination; that is, via difference-management. This argument, in turn, is based on theories of observation as proposed by George Spencer Brown (), Heinz von Foerster (), and Niklas Luhmann ().
The epistemological common denominator of these theories, however, has already been formulated in admirable clarity by the Greek philosopher Democritus. He argued that we are absolutely unable to separate perception and perceived objects from one another. We can never get behind our perceptual activities to compare the unperceived with the perceived object and so detect whether or not our perception correctly represents the ''real object.'' Object and perception, subject and object, or system and environment are, in Democritus' view, inseparable.
This fundamental insight, gained in the framework of philosophical skepticism, has never been refuted convincingly in the history of philosophy. In our time, it has been rediscovered and reformulated in theories of observation which model the basic cognitive operation as a ''real operation'' in environments. Observers, however, are strictly bound to the constraints of all observational activities. Such constraints can be analytically located on several levels-biological, psychical, social, and cultural. They developed in the course of ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic evolution, and they determine the range of possible actions of observers.
Because observers are determined by their innersystemic constraints, it is observers, not the environment, that must be regarded as the symmetrybreaking instance. In other words, all observations are observer dependent, and whatever is said is said by an observer to an observer. I cannot here go into the details of an observer-oriented (or operative) constructivism. But even the foregoing short remarks already allow us to draw two important conclusions: () objects, events, or environments are for observers during their cognitive operations in real-time situations. They are results of an empirically based and implemented difference-management through which they ''emerge'' as meaningful entities; () for this reason, objects, events, and environments are not objects in an ontological sense; they are phenomena, that is, functions of observers in terms of empirically conditioned sensorymotoric, cognitive, and communicative processes or activities. Considerations of that kind have far-reaching consequences for the concept of all scientific activities. Applied to the work of literary scholars, we have to conclude that literary scholars do not talk about literature (in terms of literary texts); they talk about culturally induced problems that arise while they make relevant experiences with phenomena they deem literary in specific situations. Academic communities believe that the only problems worth being treated in a scientific manner are those which have turned out to be of general, not merely individual, relevance. Which problems arise, when and under what conditions, and how they become accepted in scientific discourses can only be discovered empirically. This process is contingent, that is, things might have happened in a different way because in dealing with literary problems there are no ''natural'' or ''objective'' problems at all.
Observations, problems, and their solutions become relevant in terms of communications which are governed by rigid and tradition-loaded expectations and demands in the different scientific disciplines. Whoever intends to successfully contribute to scientific communication in a discipline is expected to make acceptable statements on specific topics. Those offerings have to respect the rules and regulations of disciplinary discourses not only with regard to the subject matters involved, but also with respect to texttypologies, stylistics, terminology, accepted metaphors, and so on.Through discourse-specific regulations of communication, a discipline (read: scholars operating in that discipline) selects acceptable contributions to its discourses, thus establishing the borderlines of the discipline, which in turn enable self-reference and self-organization as the basic principles of social systems.
This elementary model of scientific disciplines is based on the difference between social systems and semantic or knowledge systems. This difference brings to our attention the difference as well as the autoconstitutive interrelation between theories and communications, individuals acting in discourse systems, and institutions/organizations as well as media.
For historical reasons, as well as for reasons of a bricolage of identity, academic disciplines must always achieve a successful difference-management. On the one hand, they have to establish and maintain a convincing difference between scientific and nonscientific modes of problem-solving (science versus nonscience); on the other hand, they have to establish and maintain a sufficiently effective borderline between themselves and related disciplines to preserve their own existence (discipline A versus discipline B).
If we accept these arguments, we cannot avoid reformulating ''objective'' scholarly statements in terms of relational statements: literature-but for whom and as distinct from which other media; problems-for whom and for what reasons; and problem-solving-how and in which relation to which expectations regarding such solutions.
This kind of reformulation is much more than a systems-theoretical trick or personal obsession. Instead, it respects, in a consequential way, the insight of theories of observation which Carl F. von Weizsäcker (: ) once formulated in a very appealing way: ''When we talk about reality, we talk about reality. When we do not talk about reality, reality is not at stake. '' In addition, if it is correct to assume that the general modus operandi of all cognitive operations (including language-use) is distinction and designation, then we must seriously take into account who observes with the help of which criteria. Identity, one might roughly state, can be achieved only via difference. Therefore, if we intend to legitimate why we do what we do in the way we do it, we must mark the distinction from alternative procedures.
In other words, we have to alter our perspectives of observation; we have to try to monitor our observations to find out how and why we observe literary phenomena the way we do. Therefore, as literary scholars, we have to clarify what we hold to be literature as compared with nonliterature as well as what we deem scientific compared with nonscientific. Literary scholars need second-order observation to detect the specific contingency of their problems and problem-solving activities.
On Scientific Problem-Solving
If no consensual conception of ''science'' applicable to the activities of literary scholars exists, does this indicate there is no such ''thing'' as a scientific discipline of literary scholarship? I don't think so.
If literary scholars refuse to import a solution to theoretical and methodological problems from outside the discipline, they should be deeply inter-ested in finding a solution on the inside to retain a modicum of disciplinary identity.
I propose a coherent concept of ''science'' that does not follow the traditional distinctions between sciences and humanities, hard and soft sciences, and so on. Instead, I start with a neutral distinction of the scientific/nonscientific in order to end reach a monistic conception of ''science'' that is neither neopositivistic nor metaphysical.
My first hypothesis is: In scientific and nonscientific interactions and communications, we have experiences and solve problems. Because of the hardware of our cognitive system all these activities are emotionally loaded and automatically evaluated in normative and pragmatic respects. The difference between the two spheres of activity concerns the explicitness of the respective operations and their criteria. In other words, these activities are different with regard to the strategic application and change of observational positions and strategies.
The specificity of scientific activities can be defined as explicit problemsolving via methods. If we intend to realize this specific type of activities (for whatever reasons) we must fulfill some logical prerequisites which are not metatheoretical norms but presuppositions of the possibility of explicit problem-solving via methods which have been confirmed in the history of science. First, we need a systematically ordered conceptual framework for the constitution of phenomena and problems, that is, an explicit theory to serve as a conceptual strategy of problem-solving. The claim for explicitness can be fulfilled only if the logical structure of the theory is clear and if its crucial terms are properly defined or exemplarily demonstrated. Only then can we hope that a theory will be applied by different users in a similar way and that competing theories can be compared in a rational way.
If relevant problems in a community of investigators are constituted and formulated explicitly, then a strategy for a valid step-by-step solution must be found. Methods actualize a decision between true and false in relation to criteria of decision, and force us to proceed from a first-to a second-or third-order observation.
Only if the constitution of problems, the operationalization of problemsolving procedures, and the solution of problems are all realized explicitly and systematically can they be repeated intersubjectively and checked empirically. Then solutions can be evaluated as to their applicability for other problem-solving cases inside or outside other scientific disciplines.
These purely procedural presuppositions are extremely relevant to teaching and learning theories and methods as well as to interdisciplinary cooperation. The first is needed to reproduce high-level scholarship, the second to maintain a process of learning and transformation of knowledge in coevolution with other disciplines. Both aspects are extremely important today for the survival of literary studies as academic disciplines in the future.
Literary scholars cannot avoid observing themselves in making, evaluating, and solving problems. None of their problems or problem-solving strategies are self-evident or even natural; instead, they are all cultural and contingent. Reasonable concepts of ''literature'' and ''literary studies'' have to be developed and communicated in scientific and nonscientific contexts and discourses, so that scholarly work on literary phenomena can be observed and evaluated. Of course, this self-observation will inevitably have its blind spots. But this inherent feature of the logic of observation cannot be used as an argument against the possibility of scientific problem-solving as described above.
Should Literary Scholars Talk about Empiricity at All?
Although most literary scholars reject experimental studies in literature as positivistic or empiricistic, I advocate this type of studies on the basis of a nonpositivistic concept of ''empiricity'' which, as far as I can see, is compatible with modern hermeneutic positions.
I believe that the scientific production of knowledge occurs on the level of actions and communications in the social system called science. Scholars deal with communicatively and experimentally stabilized descriptions and distinctions in the experiential world of a society, that is to say, with facta (something made), not with data (something given).
''Empirical research'' is a production of logical, pragmatic, and social stabilities which scientists treat as if they were objective givens (a pragmatic as if, in Hans Vaihinger's [] sense). Whatever supports this construction of stabilities is regarded to be a proof of or at least an increase in plausibility, depending on which criteria are applied. Empirical research is a specific way of world-making (in Nelson Goodman's [] sense) or realityconstruction.
Heinz von Foerster () calls the production of facts according to theoretical and methodical procedures trivialization, producing stable distinctions under conditions reduced in complexity or overtly artificial (e.g., if they are performed in special labs).
If we keep in mind the observer-story described above, the ''empirical'' in scientific discourses has to be unmoored from its traditional reference to reality and first-order observation (immediate observation) and be oriented toward knowledge (or experience) and second-order observation guided and controlled by theories and methods (staged observations). Intersub-jectivity in making experiences lasts as long as its effects on/in scientific communication can be kept stable. It ends when it is superseded by a new consensual second-order observation.
Michael Stadler and Peter Kruse () have repeatedly emphasized that for constructivist scholars, empirical research and its results can provide only plausible backings and arguments, not proofs. They support the plausibility of a consistent, coherent approach to data produced according to distinct rules, one replaceable by a more coherent, consistent perspective on these or other data.
How can we characterize or define scientific empirical research? Rely on two basic assumptions:
. Only second-order observers ask for a definition of ''empirical'' in a systematic way. Accordingly, any quest for the definition of ''scientific empirical research'' should be on the level of relations between first-and secondorder observations. . If the difference between empirical and nonempirical is linked to social criteria for the kind and reliability of experiences and their results, it is reasonable to treat scientific ways of making controlled experiences the same way, that is, to orient it toward social and cultural criteria instead of ontological ones. Consequently, the contingency of all knowledge production comes to the fore.
These considerations provide a general definition: Scientific empirical research is characterized by the condition that making experiences must be performed methodically (by obeying a sequence of procedural steps) and, at least in many cases, experimentally (by applying special instruments).The distinctions or systematically ordered sets of distinctions serving the purposes of methodically controlled observations of experimental activities must be clarified and legitimated in the framework of explicit theories, which justify the selection of these and not of other possible distinctions. The criteria for accepting or rejecting such clarifications and justifications are exclusively developed and evaluated in the social system science itself.
The realization of empirical research is the performance of the operationalized procedural steps on a level of first-order activities, that is, people have to work in laboratories, read texts, ask questions, and so forth.
An important aspect of scientific empirical research manifests itself in the communicational needs of scientific discourses. The results of such research can be only stabilized in the scientific discourse(s) involved, if a relevant community of investigators consensually accepts and evaluates the concepts, procedural steps, and results of those explicitly produced experiences.
Past criteria and procedures for establishing a reliable consensus can be used as stop signals for regresses of justifications in the community of investigators. In a way they are blind cultural spots, forms of evidence not (yet) been put into question. Some of these concern implicit convictions regarding ways of world-making such as, cause and effect, space and time, or continuity and coherence. Establishing consensus describes a specific state of scientific communication, a state in which-for the time being-no objection is raised against contributions to topics in discourses. Thus, excluded are concepts of ''consensus'' or ''intersubjectivity,'' which imply or even postulate a negotiation of consensus in what Jürgen Habermas () calls ''power free communication.'' If communication (and this necessarily implies culture) is regarded as the basis for intersubjectivity and not vice versa, then we need consensus to make experiences, not experiences to make consensus.
To summarize, I define empirical research in literary studies as theory-guided operationalized production of facts which can be stabilized in scholarly discourses via communicative connectability and intersubjective inspection. As Walter J. Ong has written (: ), ''Nature does not constitute 'facts': Facts arise through human determinations which aim at making the seamless tissue of reality manageable.'' Contrary to rumor, the concept of scientific empirical research is appropriate for scientific work with literary texts, in all that concerns making experiences with such texts in a methodically controlled way. All kinds of explicit discourses on how literary phenomena may be structured and related to discourses and other components of social systems are acceptableas long as they have been performed via explicit methods explicitly justified regarding scopes and aims.
Some colleagues seem to share this view. Karl Eibl (: -), for example, wrote: ''If we happen to get rid of all display behavior [Imponiergehabe] we will see that science is nothing else but a specific methodical discipline of our everyday reason intended to produce far-reaching statements with optimal provability.'' (For more details see Schmidt , , .) What about Interpretation?
For the rare readers who are open for changes in their convictions, may I suggest some ways to escape from a discourse that is in a deadlock?
First, stop talking about interpretation and trying to define this concept. Preferably, talk about problems literary scholars intend to solve, how these problems arise, why they are deemed relevant, and so forth. If someone insists on calling such problems ''interpretations,'' this will no longer cause any harm, since we already know what we are talking about.
Second, talk about the difficulties and possibilities of solving problems in literary studies; that is, the operationalization of problems, about the productivity and reliability of strategies and procedures. Every scholar who does not confound scholarship with magic or art must answer such questions.
Third, talk about what to do with results. How can the results obtained by empirical research in literary studies be applied to problems outside the academia, and how can we transform the knowledge available in a community of investigators by systematically integrating new knowledge instead of simply replacing one opinion with another?
All discussions should retain some essentials which are accepted in current scientific discussions. First of all, it is not the literary text which means, has effects, or informs; rather, it is we who assign meanings or effects to literary texts. This is not done arbitrarily, by activating the entire cognitive apparatus, including reason and emotions, memory, norms, and values. The literary text does not decide its position in a canon; rather, the observers rank texts according to their convictions, needs, and desires. The semiotic system called literature (that is, the set of literary texts) in a society does not reproduce itself autopoietically (in Maturana's [] and Luhmann's [] sense of the term); rather, the actors in social systems produce literature from literature-or from anything else.
I know that my remarks on interpretation do not provide teachers with a quick and efficient recipe on how to interpret the literary texts in their course. And I know the answer to the question ''Why interpretation at all?'' is: ''We cannot wait until the school and the university system has changed; we have to act now!'' Finally, if my argument is taken seriously, a detrivialization and deroutinization of the scholarly work with texts becomes possible. But perhaps the situation today is such that even this goal ''is no longer aimed at.''
